CASE COMMENTARIES
ANTITRUST
Plaintiffs must allege facts that adequately define the relevant product and
geographic market in order to state a claim for which relief may be granted
under the Sherman Act. Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 963
(W.D. Tenn. 2004).
By Joseph Lodato
A complaint in an antitrust suit must adequately define the relevant markets
in its allegations in order to state a claim for relief under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act.
The plaintiff in Cupp operated a full-service hair salon. Without prior notice,
BSG, one of the plaintiff’s main suppliers of hair care products, informed the
plaintiff that the plaintiff’s supply would be discontinued unless he signed an
agreement restricting the use and resale of BSG’s products. The plaintiff refused to
sign the agreement. As a result, his salon was unable to obtain Paul Mitchell and
Redken products and suffered severe economic losses. The plaintiff filed suit,
alleging violations under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act.
In order to state a claim in an antitrust action, a plaintiff must, under §§ 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, define the relevant markets.
The determination of the relevant markets allows the court to assess the area of
competition and whether the defendant has monopolized and had an anticompetitive
effect in that market. Under the Sherman Act, a § 1 claim must show the
anticompetitive effects within the relevant markets; § 2 requires a plaintiff to define
the relevant markets in which the monopolization occurs. Under § 7 of the Clayton
Act, the threatened monopoly must be reasonably likely to restrain commerce and
substantially lessen competition within the relevant markets.
The relevant markets include both the product market and the geographic
market. The product market consists of similar products available as substitutes for
the defendant’s product, considering the product’s uses and consumer responses to
the product. In assessing the geographic market, the market area in which the seller
operates and on which the buyer can reasonably rely for supplies is determinative.
In Cupp, because the plaintiff failed to allege or establish the relevant markets
involved, the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief. His complaints, therefore, did
215
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not survive the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to define a relevant product market in any meaningful way and completely
ignored the geographic market. The court further found that, had the plaintiff
alleged the relevant markets, his claim under § 7 of the Clayton Act might have been
otherwise sufficient to survive the 12(b)(6) motion. Without the requisite
information from the plaintiff, the court was unable to determine the boundaries of
the market and, in turn, assess the defendants’ market power. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the Clayton Act claim as well.
Cupp confirms that a plaintiff whose complaint alleges violations under either
§§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act must allege facts that
adequately define the relevant product and geographic market in order to state a
claim for which relief may be granted.
BANKRUPTCY
Federal bankruptcy courts will take action against states and establish their
own payment distribution schemes. Techs. Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No.
99-5074, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1541 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 24, 2003)
By Meredith Mallard
When no remedial relief exists, a plaintiff debtor seeking prospective
injunctive relief may sue State officials who implement unlawful state practices in
bankruptcy court. The State itself, however, cannot be named as a defendant in an
adversary proceeding unless it waives its sovereign immunity. In Techs. Int’l Holdings,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, the court permitted action against the defendant State officials in
order to enjoin the State from disregarding the Constitution and the Bankruptcy
Code.
In Techs. Int’l Holdings, Inc., the plaintiffs engaged in “Corrective Action
Activities,” or the business of moving and transporting petroleum. The defendant
Fund is a governmental agency providing financial resources to landowners who
would hire the plaintiffs to remove petroleum from their underground storage tanks.
In consideration for the plaintiffs’ services, the landowners would assign to the
plaintiffs their right to receive reimbursements from the defendant Fund.
Shortly after the plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, the
defendant Commonwealth adopted an Emergency Regulation that denied
reimbursements from the Fund for debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. Instead of
compensating the plaintiffs, the Emergency Regulation permitted the defendant
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Commonwealth to directly pay the plaintiffs’ creditors, some of whom may have
been unsecured. As a result, the plaintiffs were unable to pay their secured and
unsecured creditors through the bankruptcy process.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Emergency Regulation violated the United
States Constitution and the Bankruptcy Code and sought a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the defendants from applying the Emergency Regulation. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, claiming that: (1) the
Commonwealth had sovereign immunity, (2) the Fund also enjoyed sovereign
immunity, (3) “the plaintiffs [had] not met the requirements of Ex Parte Young,” and
(4) certain of the plaintiffs’ claims alleged violations by the defendants pursuant to
“state constitutional rights or state laws.” The court began by addressing the
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
First, the court determined whether the Commonwealth defendant
“enjoy[ed] sovereign immunity [pursuant] to the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” The Supreme Court held that Congress can only abrogate state
immunity when they expressly intend to do so and act “pursuant to a valid exercise
of power.” The “majority of courts . . . have [held] that [because] the Bankruptcy
Code was not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,” Congress does not
have the power to abrogate sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy court. As a result,
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the Commonwealth defendants.
Second, the court examined whether the Fund was an agency of the
Commonwealth and, therefore, was also immune from suit. To determine whether
an entity is an “arm of the state,” the court must study “the relationship between the
State and the entity,” the “nature and effect of the proceeding”, and “whether a
money judgment against [the entity] would be enforceable against the state.” The
court held that it did not have enough information and would need the defendants’
answer and discovery filed before determining whether the Eleventh Amendment
entitled the Fund to sovereign immunity.
Third, the court confirmed the survival in the Sixth Circuit of the Ex Parte
Young doctrine. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Young doctrine
grants federal courts the power to police state activities by enjoining state officials
from executing unlawful state practices. In this case, the defendant State officials
were the “real, substantial parties,” because the plaintiffs sought prospective
injunctive relief against the application of the Emergency Regulation, as opposed to
retroactive monetary damages, which would implicate the Commonwealth alone. In
addition, Congress has not implemented a remedial scheme for the violation,
demonstrating that Congress had no intent for alternative relief.
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Finally, the court determined that the claims in the plaintiffs’ complaint
asserting state constitutional and statutory violations must be dismissed, as the
Young doctrine does not apply to state claims. State officials enjoy sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment from state law “claims brought into
federal court under pendent jurisdiction”.
As Techs. Int’l Holdings, Inc. illustrates, the federal bankruptcy courts will take
action against states and establish their own payment distribution schemes. This
decision reinforces the exclusive federal authority over the bankruptcy courts and
commands that states yield to the federal system. Further, the Sixth Circuit declared
its belief that the Bankruptcy Code has not purposefully or lawfully abrogated state
immunities but emphasized that the Young doctrine permits federal bankruptcy
courts in the Sixth Circuit to regulate state practices by enjoining the acts of State
officials. Techs. Int’l Holdings, Inc. advises bankruptcy attorneys to pursue their
federal claims against State officials, in lieu of the State, when the State has
implemented and exercises unlawful practices.
___________________
Court makes the already difficult process of equitable subordination more
difficult. In re Epic Capital Corporation, 307 B.R. 767 (D. Del. 2004).
By Patrick Woodside
Affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the District of
Delaware held that this case did not warrant application of the doctrine of equitable
subordination because Bank of New York, the party attempting to apply equitable
subordination, failed to carry the elevated burden of proof. Equitable subordination
is a remedy within the courts’ general equity powers, but “is applied sparingly.”
Thus, even though equitable subordination is a vital part of equity jurisprudence, the
party arguing for its application faces a difficult burden.
In Epic Capital Corp., Bank of New York was the successor indenture trustee
under the Indenture dated July 8, 1998, and later supplemented on January 7, 1999,
and February 3, 1999. Pursuant to the Indenture, Epic Resorts, LLC (“Epic
Resorts”) and Epic Capital Corp. (“Epic Capital”) issued $130 million in Senior
Secured Redeemable Notes, due 2005. Highland Funds holds the majority of the
Bonds. The Indenture further provided that Epic Resorts and Epic Capital would
grant Bank of New York a deed of trust in the Palm Springs Resort. Palm Springs
Resort occupies land administered by the United States Department of Interior,
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). Consequently, BIA approval was required to
grant Bank of New York a deed of trust, but BIA approval was never obtained.
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Epic Resorts Palm Springs Marquis Villas, LLC (“Epic Palm Springs”), the
Epic Resorts subsidiary which operated the Palm Springs Resort, borrowed $11.5
million from USA Capital two years after closing on the Indenture. To secure the
loan, Epic Palm Springs granted USA Capital a security interest virtually all its assets,
including the Master Lease and time shares related to the Resort. BIA approved this
security interest.
Epic Palm Springs then defaulted on its loan. Epic Resorts and Epic Capital
also defaulted on their obligation to make an $8.45 million interest payment to their
Bondholders, Highland Funds. Highland Funds subsequently filed involuntary
bankruptcy petitions against Epic Resorts, Epic Capital, and Epic Palm Springs.
Initially, Bank of New York asserted the principal argument that the
Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to equitably subordinate USA Capital’s claims.
Bank of New York contended that it could satisfy the three-prong test for equitable
subordination, and that the Bankruptcy Court erroneously fashioned a fourth
element of egregious conduct. USA Capital disagreed.
Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the Bankruptcy Court may,
after notice and a hearing, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an
allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim under the principles of equitable
subordination. Generally, three requirements must be met under the Mobile Steel
test: (1) the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (2) the
misconduct must have resulted in injury to other creditors and conferred an unfair
advantage on the claimant; and (3) equitable subordination of the claim is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
The District Court concluded where, as in the instant case, the respondent
(USA Capital) is not an insider or fiduciary of the company, the party seeking to
apply equitable subordination bears an elevated burden of proof and must show
egregious conduct such as fraud, spoliation, or overreaching. Thus, the District
Court concluded this case did not warrant application of the doctrine of equitable
subordination. Moreover, the Court found that the conduct of USA Capital was not
sufficient to rise to the level required to equitably subordinate the claim of a noninsider.
This case underscores the difficulty of satisfying the elements of equitable
subordination because it is an extraordinary remedy. Moreover, the Court has
grafted the fourth element, egregious conduct, onto the test when the respondent is
not an insider or fiduciary of the company, which makes establishing equitable
subordination more burdensome. This is also true for attorneys practicing in the
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Sixth Circuit. If a transactional attorney finds their client in a similar position to
USA Capital prior to consummation of the transaction, the attorney should advise
her client to gain reasonable assurances and documented representations of the
propriety of the transaction before continuing. Otherwise, the client may end up in a
position where their claim is subordinated, thereby losing considerable funds.
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Partnership duties normally considered “unwaivable” could instead become
negotiable. Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc., et al. v. Mulford, et al., No. E2003-00738COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 178390, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68, (Jan. 29, 2004).
By Jason Gast
A business partner’s death can be a surprise to the surviving partner,
especially if the survivor later learns troubling things about the partnership that were
unknown while the other partner still lived. In Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc. v. Mulford,
the court decided if a deceased partner’s actions had violated the partnership
agreement. The court held that the deceased partner’s actions could not have
violated the partnership agreement since those actions—trading outside the
partnership, though in the same business as the partnership--were outside the
consideration of the partners.
Prior to participating in the partnership, John D. Mulford, Jr. bought and
sold steel through his corporation, Mulford Enterprises, Inc. In 1987, Mulford and
James H. Hitchcock, an experienced player in the steel industry, agreed to form a
partnership. Under their oral agreement, they planned to buy and sell steel together,
while splitting profits and some expenses. During their partnership, both parties also
bought and sold steel outside of the partnership. Mulford acted through his prepartnership corporation with pre-partnership clients, and Hitchcock acted through
Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc. (“HMS”), a corporation he formed after joining the
partnership. Hitchcock knew that Mulford traded through his own corporation, but
it is unclear if Mulford knew about HMS.
When Hitchcock died in 1995, Mrs. Hitchcock allowed Mulford to review
Hitchcock’s account books, which fully detailed both partnership business and nonpartnership HMS business. At this point, if not before, Mulford knew that
Hitchcock had occasionally traded outside the partnership through his own private
corporation.
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For two-and-a-half years, Mulford continued to trade steel through the
partnership with Mrs. Hitchcock as his new partner, as per the partner’s survivorship
agreement. Mrs. Hitchcock felt that Mulford abused the partnership, and she sued.
Mulford counterclaimed, alleging that Mr. Hitchcock had violated the partnership
agreement for years by buying and selling steel outside of the partnership,
constituting actionable self-dealing. The trial court determined that a ban on buying
and selling steel outside the partnership was not contemplated when forming the
partnership and that, accordingly, their agreement did not prohibit this self-dealing.
In short, Hitchcock could not have violated a fiduciary duty that was not considered
when creating the partnership. Mulford appealed, claiming that Hitchcock violated
an inherent partnership duty by self-dealing.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (the Act) regulates partnerships in
Tennessee. This Act establishes a duty of loyalty, which explicitly includes the duty
not to compete with the partnership in partnership business. The Act does not say
or imply that this duty must be activated or affirmatively established.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court that the partnership had not
contemplated banning steel trades outside the partnership. Because the parties did
not ban trades outside the partnership, Hitchcock did not breach a duty to trade only
within the partnership.
Finally, the appeals court found that the eight years of extra-partnership
trades, on both sides, reflected the parties’ intent to allow such trades. The appeals
court dismissed Mulford’s stated ignorance of Hitchcock’s extra-partnership trades.
The court felt that because Mulford never complained about Hitchcock’s trading
after he indisputably learned of the trades, his silence indicated support for the extrapartnership trades.
The court of appeals never said that the partners had no fiduciary duty
against self-dealing, nor did the court say that Hitchcock’s actions were insufficiently
related to the business of the partnership to trigger that duty. Instead, the court
found that Hitchcock did not violate the duty because the extra-partnership trades
were deemed outside of the partnership agreement. Based on this rationale, partners
could mutually avoid some fiduciary duties if the duties are not addressed in the
partnership agreement and are also never honored during the course of the
partnership. Partnership duties normally considered “unwaivable” could instead
become negotiable, thus making partnerships more customizable. Consequently,
transactional attorneys should carefully consider and draft partnership duties in the
partnership agreement.
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Employee must prove his inability to perform a wide range of jobs in order to
prevail on an ADA claim. Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir.
2004).
By Elizabeth Saxton
A court will consider an employee “disabled” if his employer perceives his
condition as an ADA qualifying disability, even if the employee’s condition does not
actually meet the ADA standard. However, the employee still needs to prove that
the employer views this impairment as one that restricts him from a broad range of
jobs to prevail on an ADA claim.
In Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., BSA employed Jean Carruthers as an art
director from 1993 until 2000. On February 28, 2000, Carruthers’ assigned workers’
compensation physician diagnosed her with a bilateral hand strain. Accordingly, he
gave her several work restrictions including one which prohibited all typing and
mouse usage. Unfortunately for Carruthers, ninety percent of her work at BSA
involved computer usage. Carruthers alerted her supervisor of her work restriction,
and by March 5, 2000, BSA had placed an advertisement her replacement. BSA
terminated Carruthers on March 8, 2000. Carruthers then filed suit against BSA
alleging wrongful termination in violation of the ADA. At trial, the district court
granted BSA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
On appeal, the court followed the United States Supreme Court’s recent
definition of “impairment” and affirmed the district court’s judgment. This
definition, found in Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), states
that an “impairment” is a “disability” only when the impairment prevents or
substantially restricts one’s performance of activities “of central importance to most
people’s daily lives.” In affirming the judgment below, the court stated that
Carruthers needed to display that BSA viewed her impairment as restricting her from
performing either a class of jobs or broad range of jobs at the level of an average
individual with compatible training, skills, and abilities. Carruthers’ inability to
perform one individual job did not equate to a substantial limitation in the life
activity of working. Thus, Carruthers’ inability to use a keyboard and mouse
constituted neither an inability to perform a broad range of jobs nor showed that
BSA had such perception.
In summary, the strict definition of “disability” creates a substantial hurdle
for plaintiffs to clear in establishing an ADA claim. The test is not whether an
employee is unable to perform his specific job, but instead whether he is unable to
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perform a wide range of jobs or his employer perceives him to be unable to perform
a wide range of jobs.
_________________________________
In the event of a cash-out merger, shareholders of a parent corporation have
the requisite financial interest to maintain a derivative action for the
disgorgement of profits obtained by insiders of a corporate subsidiary under §
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. DiLorenzo v. Edgar, Civ. No. 03-841-SLR,
2004 WL 609374, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4991 (D. Del. 2004).
By Adam Smith
In a derivative action brought under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (the “1934 Act”), “[a] shareholder of a
parent corporation has a financial interest, albeit tenuous, in the disgorgement of
profits obtained by insiders of a corporate subsidiary.” This “financial interest” in
the outcome of a § 16(b) suit satisfies the constitutional requirements necessary for
maintaining a derivative action following the cancellation of a stockholder’s shares in
the parent corporation’s subsidiary during a cash-out merger.
On May 12, 2003, the defendants, four directors of dELiA*s Corporation
(“dELiA*s”), purchased an aggregate of 7,297,298 shares of dELiA*s common
stock. The common stock of dELiA*s then was registered under the 1934 Act.
Shortly thereafter, in a merger with an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Alloy,
Inc. (“Alloy”), the defendants’ recently purchased shares were converted into cast at
a significant premium. However, before the merger closed on September 7, 2003,
the plaintiff, a stockholder in dELiA*s and Alloy, instituted a derivative action
alleging that the defendants obtained short-swing profits in violation of § 16(b) of
the 1934 Act. Although the plaintiff’s shares in dELiA*s were cashed-out and
canceled in the merger, the plaintiff preserved his interest in Alloy throughout the
course of litigation. In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the suit because (1) he
was no longer a dELiA*s stockholder and (2) he did not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1’s demand requirements prior to commencing the suit.
For stockholders to bring a derivative action on behalf of a corporation
under § 16(b), they must satisfy three requirements: (1) The stockholders must own
a security issued by the corporation (2) the stockholders must own that security at
the time the § 16(b) derivative action is instituted; and (3) the security traded by the
corporate insider must be a 1934 Act registered security issued by the same
corporation as the security held by the plaintiff stockholders. Once these three
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requirements for standing are satisfied, the stockholders need not maintain continual
ownership of the security throughout the course of litigation if they maintain a
sufficient financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.
In DiLorenzo, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
first addressed the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff lacked the necessary
standing to maintain the § 16(b) suit because he was no longer a dELiA*s
stockholder. The court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991), noted that if a stockholder has the proper standing at
the commencement of a § 16(b) action, “an involuntary change in his status as a
security holder resulting from a restructuring will not affect his standing to maintain
the suit so long as minimal constitutional requirements are satisfied through the
presence of some financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Although
Gollust involved a stock merger rather than a cash-out merger, the DiLorenzo court
was unwilling to allow the form of corporate restructuring to frustrate § 16(b)’s
“remedial purpose.” Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiff, as an
Alloy stockholder, had a sufficient financial interest in the outcome of the suit to
satisfy the constitutional requirements essential to maintain the derivative action.
The court next addressed the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff lacked
the necessary standing to maintain the suit because he failed to make a demand upon
dELiA*s board of directors in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
before instituting the action. The court summarily stated that Rule 23.1 does not
apply to § 16(b) actions; rather, the demand requirement for derivative suits under §
16(b) are governed by § 16(b) itself. Furthermore, citing two New York cases, the
court noted that in certain circumstances, other courts have excused § 16(b)’s
demand requirement when demand would be futile.
In this case, the court found that the demand requirement should be excused
as futile in light of Alloy’s acquisition of dELiA*s and the defendants’ control of
dELiA*s board of directors. The court pointed out that the defendants represented
four of eleven members (less than a majority) of the board, represented three of four
of dELiA*s former officers, and collectively owned 37.8% of dELiA*s stock. In
contrast, Delaware decisional law regarding derivative suits brought in accordance
with Court of Chancery Rule 23.2 (a Delaware state rule of civil procedure) may
require a majority—or, where there is an even number of directors, at least 50%--of
the board to be “interested” or lacking in “independence” before excusing pre-suit
demand as futile. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984); In re The
Limited, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 27, 2002). Considering the “short timing” of the merger, the court
recognized that the plaintiff’s shares in dELiA*s likely would have been canceled by
the time a proper demand could have been made. Furthermore, the court noted that
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the failure of dELiA*s board to commence a § 16(b) action after learning of the
plaintiff’s action supported the allegations of demand futility.
The DiLorenzo decision increases the class of potential plaintiffs that can
maintain a properly initiated § 16(b) suit. Specifically, the DiLorenzo court found
that a plaintiff who owns stock in both a parent corporation and its subsidiary has a
continuing financial interest in the subsidiary (through the plaintiff’s continued
ownership of the parent corporation’s shares) after the plaintiff’s shares in the
subsidiary are canceled as a result of a corporate restructuring. This continuing
financial interest may give the plaintiff stockholder standing in a properly initiated
derivative suit brought on behalf of the subsidiary under § 16(b). Transactional
attorneys and corporate litigators alike should also note that federal courts may waive
§ 16(b)’s demand requirement—at least when ruling on a motion to dismiss—if
minimal levels of demand futility arguably exist and are properly pled.
CONTRACTS
Expiration without a clause: Contracts without an express expiration date that
grant an interest in a business venture can expire based upon time’s passage
and the parties’ course of performance. Martin v. King, No. E2002-03055-COAR3-CV, 2003 WL 23099677, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 921 (Dec. 30, 2003).
By David Headrick
The Tennessee Court of Appeals contemplated whether parties that
contracted to grant an interest in a failed business venture are bound to grant the
interest in a subsequently developed successful venture in the same industry. The
court held that a plaintiff suing for the grant of interest in a subsequently developed
venture was not entitled to this interest because the contract, although not
containing an express expiration date, had expired based upon time’s passage and the
parties’ course of performance.
In Martin v. King, John Curtis King (“King”) endeavored to develop a landfill
in Scott County, Tennessee. R. Scott Martin (“Martin”) orally expressed to King that
he would procure a multi-million dollar investor. On December 15, 1990, the parties
executed the following agreement (“Agreement”), “For and in consideration of
services rendered . . . [King] does hereby agree to . . . convey a three (3%) percent
interest in his business known as ‘Roberta Sanitary Landfill’ . . . to [Martin].” The
project failed to gain ground. In 1992, King repurchased a 12% interest that he had
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previously conveyed to his son via the agreement. The interest cost $10,000. Soon
after, King and Martin completely ceased communications with each other. In 1995,
King purchased an existing landfill under a new corporation called Scott County
Solid Waste Disposal Company (“Scott Solid Waste”). He applied the proceeds to
further pursue the Roberta Sanitary Landfill. However, the lack of capital ultimately
forced King to sell Scott Solid Waste to Liberty Waste Services in 1998.
In 1999, Martin filed suit seeking 3% of the proceeds generated from the sale
of Scott Solid Waste. Both the trial court and the court of appeals found that Martin
had generally failed to perform, and that Scott Solid Waste was completely separate
from the original Agreement. The Agreement contemplated the Plaintiff’s financing
assistance for Robert Sanitary Landfill, but not the sale of a subsequent business
venture by the Defendant. Martin had performed “only a minimal amount of work”
three years after the execution of the contract. Further, King formed Scott Solid
Waste unassisted two years after the parties ceased to communicate with each other
entirely. This “clear line of demarcation” between the venture covered by the
Agreement and King’s subsequent business venture negated Martin’s claim that the
sale of Scott Solid Waste was part of the original Agreement’s scope. Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court’s $4,500 award covering attorney fee reimbursement and a
pro-rated 3% interest in Roberta Sanitary Landfill synonymous with the rate
Defendant had paid his son in 1992.
As Martin illustrates, contracts granting a business venture interest without an
express expiration date can expire based upon the passage of time and the parties’
course of performance. However, transactional attorneys should draft contracts with
limited scopes and finite timeframes to protect their clients and to prevent later
overly broad readings of contractual terms. Individuals and businesses alike tend to
utilize their core competencies by staying in the same industry, thus allowing
ambiguous contracts to potentially affect subsequent, unrelated transactions.
Martin’s usage of the original Agreement against King’s later business venture
highlights the necessity of greater specificity in contract drafting. Although the court
found that the contract had expired, a legal question survived and, no doubt, cost the
Defendant time and money.
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Buy-out provisions will bar injunctive relief where the parties have agreed
upon such a provision in a non-compete agreement. Murfreesboro Med. Clinic,
P.A. v. Udom, No. M2003-00313-COA-R9-CV, 2004 WL 193049, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS
743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
By Lexi Walsh
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic v. Udom states that non-compete agreements will
only upheld in Tennessee if they are reasonable under the circumstances. Udom
provides elements of reasonableness and holds that temporary injunctions are only a
permissible remedy for breach of a non-compete agreement where no monetary
remedy exists.
In Murfreesboro Med. Clinic v. Udom, Dr. David Udom (“Udom”) entered into
an employment contract to practice internal medicine for plaintiff, Murfreesboro
Medical Clinic (“MMC”), which also contained a non-compete agreement provision
stating that Udom would not practice medicine within a twenty-file mile radius of
Murfreesboro Public Square for eighteen months following his employment with
MMC. The non-compete agreement also contained a buy-out provision that
permitted Udom to practice medicine within the proscribed area if he paid MMC an
amount equal to twelve times his most recent monthly salary.
After MMC chose not to extend Udom’s contract, Udom violated the noncompete agreement by opening a medical practice fifteen miles from Murfreesboro
Public Square in Smyrna. MMC sought to temporarily enjoin Udom’s Smyrna
practice. The trial court temporarily enjoined Udom from practicing at the Smyrna
location unless he paid $120,000 to the court clerk. Udom appealed, raising the
issues of whether the Chancery Court erred in granting MMC a temporary injunction
and whether the non-compete clause was valid.
A temporary injunction is only proper where the plaintiff’s threatened injury
is irreparable. In Tennessee, the injury is not irreparable where there is an adequate
remedy at law. The court’s finding of irreparable injury was incorrect because the
buy-out provision provided MMC with an adequate remedy at law. Thus, the
temporary injunction was reversed.
Udom claimed that as a private physician, he should not be bound by the
clause because it was “overly broad, unreasonable, not protecting a publicly
recognized interest, and void as against public policy.” Although Tennessee law
disfavors non-compete agreements because they are restrictive of trade, they will be
enforced when reasonable as applied to the facts of the case. To determine the
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reasonableness of the agreement, the court considered whether there was
consideration supporting the agreement, whether the threatened harm to MMC
would be great without the agreement, whether the agreement placed economic
hardship on Udom, and whether the agreement was contrary to public policy.
The court found that MMC’s annual salary of $120,000 to Udom was fair
consideration for Udom’s services and adherence with the non-compete clause and
that MMC’s business interest was threatened by Udom’s practice in Smyrna. The
court also found that the economic hardship on Udom was minimal because he was
able to continue his Smyrna practice and pay $120,000 to the court. Finally, the
court analyzed the agreement in relation to public policy; the court recognized the
public’s interest in choice of healthcare providers, an interest not impeded by the
clause because Udom’s patients could drive outside the geographic limitation to see
him and because he could continue to practice in Smyrna after satisfying the buy-out
provision. Although the court emphasized the necessity of protecting MMC’s
legitimate business interest, they also emphasized the public’s interest in the freedom
to contract.
This court concluded that the non-compete agreement was valid and
enforceable because the twenty-five mile geographic limitation and the eighteenmonth duration of the clause were reasonable. The court remanded the case to
determine the specific monetary amount that would reasonably satisfy the buy-out
provision.
Udom reiterates the notion that injunctions are only proper in cases where
no remedy at law exists and that a buy-out provision is an adequate legal remedy.
Furthermore, Udom illustrates that reasonable non-compete agreements between
private physicians and for-profit medical facilities are enforceable in Tennessee.
However, Udom does not set a reasonableness standard for determining the
monetary amount that will satisfy a buy-out provision. A transactional attorney
should advise employee clients to insist on a concrete figure buy-out provision;
employer clients should recognize that buy-out provisions will bar injunctive relief
where the parties have agreed upon a buy-out provision.
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Where there is no explicit language limiting the benefits of the contract to the
principal parties, the intent of the principal parties to the contract determines
whether a third party is an intended “third-party beneficiary” of the contract.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. M2002-01752-COA-R3-CV, 2004
WL 431488, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (2004).
By Jason Whitler
When parties to a contract do not explicitly limit the benefits of a promised
performance to the principal parties involved, it is often difficult to determine
whether a third party is an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. Although
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. Concord EFS, Inc. established the test for
determining whether a third party is an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract,
applying the test and determining the intent of the principal parties remains a
difficult task as evidenced by the decision in Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins.
Co. In this case the court held that a third party was an intended third-party
beneficiary.
In Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., Chili’s Restaurant in Nashville
(“Chili”s) entered into a lease agreement with RMR Investments and Gower Center,
Ltd. (“RMR/Gower”). RMR/Gower owned the property where the restaurant was
located. The agreement required Chili’s to insure the improvements against loss or
damage by fire and to name RMR/Gower as loss payee or additional insured. Under
the agreement, if the premises or improvements were destroyed by fire, Chili’s could
terminate the lease and RMR/Gower would receive all of the insurance proceeds
except for those proceeds Chili’s would receive for the loss of personal property. As
required, Chili’s, a corporate subsidiary of Brinker International, Inc. (“Brinker”),
secured insurance coverage through Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”).
The certificate of insurance named RMR/Gower as certificate holder and as
additional insured.
A fire subsequently destroyed the restaurant, and Chili’s terminated the lease.
Lexington then paid the proceeds for the damage to the building to RMR/Gower,
and the proceeds for loss of personal property to Chili’s. However, RMR/Gower
submitted an additional claim to Lexington for rental income it would have received
had Chili’s not terminated the lease; Lexington denied the additional claim.
RMR/Gower then submitted a claim for lost rental income to its insurer, Charter
Oak Fire Insurance Company (“Charter Oak”), which Charter Oak paid; however,
Lexington refused to reimburse Charter Oak for the amounts it paid to
RMR/Gower.
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Charter Oak then sued Lexington for breach of contract under the theory
that RMR/Gower was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Chili’s and
Lexington. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lexington.
The issue presented is whether the trial court was correct in granting
summary judgment in favor of Lexington based on the theory that Lexington did not
intend for RMR/Gower to be a third-party beneficiary with respect to losses of
rental income?
In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. Concord EFS, Inc., the Tennessee
Supreme Court reformulated its analysis for determining third-party beneficiary
status. According to Concord, a third party qualifies as a third-party beneficiary of a
contract when: (1) the principal parties had not otherwise determined the third party
was not a beneficiary; (2) acknowledging the third party’s right to performance is
necessary to effectuate the intent of the parties; and (3) the provisions of the contract
or the matters relating to performance show that either: (a) the fulfillment of the
promise will meet an obligation or satisfy a duty that the promisee owes to the
beneficiary; or (b) the promisee plans to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.
In reference to the first element of the Concord test, the contract did not
explicitly limit contractual benefits to the principal parties, and RMR/Gower’s listing
as an additional insured was evidence that Chili’s purchased the insurance, at least to
some degree, for RMR/Gower’s benefit.
The court then had to determine whether acknowledging the third party’s
right to performance is necessary to put the intention of the parties into effect. The
policy had a page called “Rental Income Extension,” whereby the principal parties
agreed that the policy would “cover loss of rental income resulting from necessary
untenantability, caused by damage to or destruction of the building(s) . . . .”
Lexington argued that this provision only applied to situations where Brinker/Chili’s
did not receive rent from properties where they acted as landlord. Nonetheless, the
court concluded that this coverage would apply to RMR/Gower since Lexington did
not put any language in the policy limiting the provision’s application.
To satisfy the last prong of the Concord test the court had to decide whether
the fulfillment of the promise would satisfy a duty that the promisee owed to the
beneficiary or whether the promisee planned to give the beneficiary the benefit of
the promised performance. The court first noted that the lease agreement required
Chili’s to name RMR/Gower as additional insured under the Lexington policy. In
this lease agreement, Lexington and Chili’s agreed that RMR/Gower would receive
“all insurance proceeds” that were paid out “by reason of the occurrence of such fire
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or other casualty” except for those paid to Chili’s for loss of personal property. The
court indicated that this was sufficient evidence to satisfy the last prong of the
Concord test. Having determined that RMR/Gower satisfied all of the elements of
the Concord test, the court concluded that RMR/Gower was an intended third-party
beneficiary of the loss of rental income section of the Lexington policy and reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
As Charter Oak demonstrates, the intent of the principal parties governs
whether a third party was an intended beneficiary of a contract. In the absence of
explicit language limiting the benefits of the promised performance to the principal
parties to the contract, a party will qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary
where the fulfillment of a promise would satisfy a duty that the promisee owed to
the beneficiary. Transactional attorneys should include explicit language limiting the
benefits of the agreement to the principal parties involved.
INSURANCE
Credit life insurance companies can rely on health-related exclusions without
initially inquiring about the applicant’s health. Osborne v. Mountain Life Ins. Co.,
130 S.W.3d 769 (Tenn. 2004).
By Darsi Newman
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that health-related exclusions in credit
life insurance policies are valid even if the insurance company does not initially
inquire about the applicant’s health, so long as the company does not falsely
represent or conceal policy information. The court also held that a new insurance
policy begins each time a loan is renewed or refinanced. Thus, the time limits in the
policy exclusions are triggered anew with each new loan.
In this case, Osborne signed a one-year note with Jones Tractor Company in
January 1997. Osborne renewed the note each year, with the final renewal occurring
on January 13, 2000. Jones Tractor immediately assigned the notes to First
Community Bank. According to the beneficiary, Osborne purchased credit life
insurance in connection with the original note and with each subsequent renewal.
The bank acted as Mountain Life’s agent in these transactions. However, Osborne’s
communications concerning the life insurance were only with Jones Tractor.
An endorsement to the credit life insurance policy limited Mountain Life’s
liability to premiums paid by the insured if, within six months of the policy’s
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effective date, the insured received medical treatment or advice for an injury or
health condition that caused the insured’s death within the same six month period.
Osborne was diagnosed with cancer in November 1999 and received treatment for
that disease until his death on March 21, 2000. The beneficiary filed a claim with
Mountain Life. Mountain Life returned the policy premium but declined to pay any
benefits based on the six-month exclusion.
The beneficiary contended that because the policy ran continuously from the
time of Osborne’s original note in 1997, the six-month exclusion did not apply.
Mountain Life responded that each policy certificate was effective only for the life of
the loan. Each time Osborne renewed the loan, Mountain Life treated it as a new
obligation. As such, Mountain Life issued a new policy certificate for every renewal,
thus triggering the six-month exclusion every January. Because Mountain Life issued
the certificate for the year 2000 on January 13, the exclusion applied when Osborne
died on March 21.
The Court of Appeals disregarded the issue of the effective date, holding sua
sponte that Mountain Life was estopped from relying on the six-month exclusion
because it did not inquire about Osborne’s health when he purchased the certificate.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals, first determined that, based
on state statutes and relevant policy provisions, the effective date of the certificate
was January 13, 2000. It then determined that Mountain Life could rely on the sixmonth exclusion because all of the elements of estoppel had not been met.
Equitable estoppel requires conduct that amounts to a false representation or
concealment of material facts. Because Osborne had no contact with Mountain Life
or its agent, the record offered no evidence that Mountain Life made any
representations, false or otherwise, or that Mountain Life concealed material
information with regard to policy provisions. The court distinguished this case from
a previous case in which the insurance company’s agent told the insured that the
policy “would pay” the debt in the event of the insured’s death and did not reference
a “sound health” condition in the policy.
This decision reassures credit life insurance companies that they can rely on
health-related exclusions in their policies, even when they do not inquire about the
applicant’s health. However, lawyers representing these companies should advise
their clients to ensure that their agents are trained not to make blanket assurances to
customers without mentioning the exclusions or conditions contained in the policy.
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PROPERTY
How a third party establishes a new rental price for property previously under
Lease that they purchased at a foreclosure sale. Kokomo Grain Co. v. Collins, No.
M2003-00376-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 626722, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Mar.
26, 2004).
By Jerry J. Fabus
Applying Tennessee law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a new
landlord, who acquired rental property by way of a foreclosure sale, is required to
give the holdover tenant a reasonable notice of a definite and unequivocal demand
before being allowed to unilaterally increase the rent.
On December 10, 2001, Randy Collins (“Collins”) purchased a storage
facility at a foreclosure sale that Kokomo Grain Co. (“Kokomo”) was leasing for
$1,500 per month from the previous owner. On January 2, 2002, Collins requested
by way of letter that Kokomo pay $6,500 per month for the continued use of the
storage facility. On January 7, 2001, Collins mailed a second letter to Kokomo that
acknowledged the receipt of January’s rent for $1,500 but stated that this rent
payment was unacceptable. Neither letter contained a notice of termination of the
lease or a notice to vacate. The parties continued to negotiate but did not resolve the
matter. Kokomo then filed this action when Collins refused to allow Kokomo to
remove its grain from the storage facility. After Kokomo posted a $25,000 bond,
Collins allowed Kokomo to remove the last of its grain on March 27, 2002.
Both the trial court and court of appeals held that Collins was precluded
from recovering his asking price of $6,500 per month and that the fair market rental
value for the months of January, February, and March was $1,500 per month. The
courts reached this conclusion based on two aspects of Tennessee law. First, a
foreclosure sale terminates a lease if the mortgage was recorded prior to the lease.
Therefore, Collins and Kokomo were completely free to negotiate. Second, the
landlord is required to give the holdover tenant a reasonable notice of a definite and
unequivocal demand before being allowed to unilaterally increase this rent. Collins
never gave this type of notice. Because he did not make an unequivocal demand,
Collin’s actions were instead interpreted to be an attempt to negotiate new terms and
conditions of a lease. Because no agreement was ever reached between the parties,
the trial judge was responsible for establishing the fair market value for the months
in dispute, which he set at $1,500 per month.
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This decision makes clear that a new landlord who is not subject to a prior
lease needs to act decisively, choosing either to give a definite and unequivocal
demand to the holdover tenant or to negotiate with this tenant. Kokomo, while not
creating any new law, is an excellent example of what can happen when new
landowners do not undertake a decisive course of action because they are not fully
aware of the legal consequences.
__________________________
All Tennessee residents are considered beneficiaries of conservation
easements and have standing to enforce the land use restrictions. Tennessee
Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
419720, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Mar. 8, 2004).
By Gennie Gieselmann
According to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, any Tennessee resident is a
beneficiary of a conservation easement and has standing to sue to enforce it.
Ordinarily, for a party to have standing, they must demonstrate the presence of a
distinct and severable injury. However, the statutory language of Tennessee Code
Annotated § 66-9-301, et. seq., states that the “holder and/or beneficiaries” of a
conservation easement may enforce the easement. For purposes of standing to
enforce conservation easements, the definition of “beneficiaries” now includes all
Tennessee residents.
A conservation easement grants a nonprofit organization or governmental
entity the authority to regulate and uphold the land use restrictions set forth in the
easement. Conservation easements operate in accordance with federal and state
regulations. The restrictions in a conservation easement often ban certain activities
that are detrimental to the protected resources. Because the conservation easements
are negotiated agreements between the landowner and the grantee, the landowner
usually reserves certain land use rights, such as the ability to own, occupy, or use the
property in a certain manner.
The instant conservation easement conveyed approximately forty acres along
the South Chickamauga Creek in Chattanooga, Tennessee, to the City of
Chattanooga in 1996. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ impending
commercial developments would cause pollution, irreparable damage, and runoff to
the creek in violation of state and federal contamination limits for a protected
waterway. The defendants, owners and developers of commercially zoned property
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near South Chickamauga Creek, maintained that the proposed developments would
not cause irreversible harm to either the plaintiffs or the creek.
Following the issuance of a temporary restraining order to halt construction,
a preliminary hearing was held to determine whether Ms. Kurtz, an individual
plaintiff and private citizen in the original complaint, had standing to sue to enforce
the conservation easement. The Chancellor found that Ms. Kurtz failed to establish
a distinct and severable injury that was unique from the general public; therefore, she
did not have standing. Moreover, the Chancellor held that the only party to have
standing to enforce the easement was the City of Chattanooga, the grantee of the
easement. The Chancellor then dismissed the complaint, removing the temporary
restraining order. On appeal, The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed.
According to Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-9-307, “[c]onservation
easements may be enforced by injunction or proceedings in equity by the holders
and/or beneficiaries of the easement, or their bona fide representatives, heirs, or
assigns.” The City of Chattanooga was clearly the grantee and holder of the
conservation easement and had the authority to enforce the easement. However, the
beneficiaries of the easement still remained undetermined.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals decided the meaning of beneficiary under a
conservation easement by using statutory construction. The language “and/or
beneficiaries” means that the beneficiary is someone who is not the grantee; instead,
a beneficiary is one who benefits from the act of another. According to Tennessee
Code Annotated § 66-9-303, a conservation easement is “held for the benefit of the
people of Tennessee.” Therefore, any resident of Tennessee has standing to enforce
a conservation easement.
The court offered several supporting arguments to bolster their conclusion.
First, the court highlighted the conformity of their interpretation to both the deed
and the statute. Second, the court relied on the legal reasoning that requires courts
to give liberal construction to a remedial statute. Finally, the court reasoned that the
Legislature clearly intended such interpretation because the language of the statute
did not mirror the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, which provides that the
grantee is the only party with authority to enforce the conservation easement. Had
the Legislature intended such construction of the statute, they would have inserted
the proper language.
The court’s decision to extend standing to all residents of Tennessee to
enforce conservation easements exposes several legal issues. First, potential
developers should be aware that lawsuits to enforce the land restrictions in a
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conservation easement may be brought by virtually anyone living in the state of
Tennessee. Second, landowners in the negotiation stage of drafting a conservation
easement should consider that if they participate in an activity not permitted by the
easement, any resident of Tennessee could sue to prevent them from enjoying their
land. To avoid potential liability, transactional attorneys should designate who the
holder of the easement is and who the beneficiaries of the easement are. Otherwise,
any Tennessee resident may sue to enforce the land restrictions set forth in a
conservation easement.
____________________
Personal jurisdiction required for class action suits. Williams v. Firstplus Home
Loan Owner Trust, 310 F. Supp. 2d 981 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).
By Ted Morrissey
In class action suits involving out of state defendants, plaintiffs must
establish general personal jurisdiction. Without establishing personal jurisdiction,
plaintiffs have no standing to bring an action against a defendant, even a national
entity allegedly in violation of state statutory law. To address alleged violations of
state law, plaintiffs must establish that the entity is doing business or has ties in the
jurisdiction. In Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust (Firstplus), the district
court required the plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction before proceeding with alleged
violations of state laws regarding home loans.
Two groups of plaintiffs, the Williams (Firstplus Plaintiffs) and the Stallings
(Seacoast Plaintiffs), filed their cases as class actions in federal court; the cases were
subsequently consolidated. The Firstplus Plaintiffs obtained from Firstplus
Financial, Inc. (Firstplus) a second mortgage home equity loan secured by their
respective residences. The Firstplus Plaintiffs claimed that after closing their loan,
Firstplus consolidated the loans into a loan pool and assigned the loan pool to U.S.
Bank, National Association (USBNA). The Seacoast Plaintiffs asserted similar facts
against different defendants. Their loans were assigned to Empire Funding and
others (Empire), who consolidated the loans into a loan pool and assigned the loan
pool to USBNA. None of either group’s assignments were recorded in Shelby
County.
The issue presented is whether the defendants are subject to personal
jurisdiction in Tennessee. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the court
can dismiss a claim for lack of jurisdiction over the person. The plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing jurisdiction and absent an evidentiary hearing on that matter,
needs only to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction can be
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general, arising when a defendant has continuous and systematic contact with the
state, or specific, arising when a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum
state that arise from or are related to the cause of action.
The court ruled that the Seacoast Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
regarding general personal jurisdiction over Empire. The court found that Empire
was merely an assignee of a mortgage note secured by property in Tennessee and
that that fact alone was insufficient to show substantial contacts with the forum
state. The court also held that the actions of the servicer of the mortgage notes did
not establish general personal jurisdiction over the notes’ out of state assignees based
on the plaintiffs’ failure to show an agency relationship warranting general personal
jurisdiction.
On the issue of specific personal jurisdiction, the court ruled that the
Seacoast Plaintiffs failed to show that Empire purposely availed itself of the
privileges of acting in Tennessee, stating that purchasing a consolidated loan pool
containing loans secured by real property located in Tennessee did not demonstrate
intent to avail oneself of the privileges of acting in Tennessee.
Finally, on the issue of whether the court could exercise personal jurisdiction
over USBNA, the court found that the plaintiffs met their burden of proof based on
USBNA’s maintenance of more than sixty branch locations in Tennessee and
involvement in several foreclosures. Exercising personal jurisdiction over USBNA
based on these contacts did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice because these contacts imply that USBNA conducts substantial business
within Tennessee.
Thus, the court granted Empire’s motion to dismiss but denied USBNA’s
motion to dismiss. Empire was a mere assignee of loan pools containing property in
Tennessee, had no other contacts with Tennessee, and had not specifically sought
loans secured by property in Tennessee. On the other hand, USBNA conducted
substantial business such that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction was
appropriate. Based on this holding, merely holding a loan secured by property in
Tennessee is not enough to create general or specific personal jurisdiction.
However, holding such loans in combination with continuous and systematic
contacts is more than enough.
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Unlicensed contractors who suffer from a breach of contract may recover
actual damages. Ebert v. Ekelem, No. M2002-00842-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
578595, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 180 (2004).
By Chad R. White
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that even though a tradesman is
required to have a license when he contracts directly with a property owner for work
exceeding $25,000, his lack of a contractor’s license does not limit his recovery to
$25,000 if the owner breaches the contract. The tradesman may recover “actual
documented expenses” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-6-103(b).
Dr. Ifeatu Ekelem, a property owner, contracted with Justin C. Ebert, a
tradesman, to complete framing and roofing work on his house for a fee of $30,000.
Dr. Ekelem was to supply all necessary materials and pay Ebert bi-weekly
installments. Towards completion of the project, Dr. Ekelem breached the contract
by failing to pay Ebert the money due. As a result of this breach, Ebert left the job.
Ebert filed a mechanic’s lien against the property; however, he filed the lien
past the deadline. Ebert then filed a complaint against Dr. Ekelem for “breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and enforcement of his lien.” The trial court awarded
Ebert a $6,642.81 judgment. Dr. Ekelem appealed.
The chief issue in this case dealt with the Contractor’s Licensing Act of 1994.
This act requires individuals who engage in “contracting” to have a license if they
enter into a contract for $25,000 or more. Contractors licensing statutes, which have
been revised frequently and have changed the definitions of “contractors” and
“contracting,” without defining “subcontractor” and “subcontracting,” have greatly
affected tradesmen like Ebert who only complete a portion of a project and may not
believe they need a license. Section 62-6-103(a)(2)(A) excuses property owners who
build their own houses from being licensed, but it does not address those who
contract with such owners. The court held that tradesmen such as Ebert were
required to have a license if they contracted directly with a property owner for
$25,000 or more.
Dr. Ekelem argued that Ebert is not entitled to recover any further claim
because the doctor already paid $25,000 for Ebert’s services. The court held that Dr.
Ekelem misread the statutes, and the damages that an unlicensed contractor may
collect are not limited to $25,000. The court further held that § 62-6-103(b) does,
however, limit the amount Ebert may recover to “actual documented expenses.”
The court remanded the case and held that Ebert would be allowed to present
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evidence to show that his expenses exceeded the amount Dr. Ekelem had already
paid him.
Ebert shows the problems that may arise when a tradesman, who lacks a
contractor’s license, contracts directly with a property owner for a portion of a
project instead of going through a general contractor. Transactional lawyers should
advise clients who are tradesmen or contractors to obtain a contractor’s license prior
to contracting directly with a property owner for projects where the contract price is
$25,000 or more. They should further advise their clients to keep detailed records,
document all expenses, and be aware of filing deadlines. Lawyers with clients who
are already in a situation similar to Ebert or Dr. Ekelem should advise their clients of
the applicable recovery rights an unlicensed tradesman may still possess.
TAX
Tax assessment against a partnership is enough to extend three-year statute
of limitations for collection of employment taxes from individual partners
even if the partnership subsequently files for bankruptcy. United States v. Galletti,
541 U.S. 114, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 158 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2004).
By C. Damon Gunnels
When an employment tax liability is properly assessed against a partnership
and the general partners subsequently file for bankruptcy protection after the threeyear statute of limitations has run, the employment tax liability automatically attaches
to the individual general partners, who may be jointly and severally liable for all of
the partnership’s debt. The tax liability is assessed on the debt as a whole, not
necessarily on an individual taxpayer, and if the tax debt was timely assessed within
three years of the filing of returns, the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) extends the
time allowed to collect on the debt to ten years. Therefore, individual general
partners cannot claim the tax should have been assessed against them individually,
and the government has ten years to collect the debt. This was the issue decided by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Galletti.
In Galletti, the Marina Cabrillo Company, a general partnership, failed to pay
its federal employment tax liabilities for the years 1992 to 1995. The Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) assessed those tax liabilities against the partnership in 1994,
1995, and 1996; however, the partnership never paid the tax debt. Subsequently, the
partnership’s general partners, Abel and Sarah Galletti and Francesco and Angela
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Briguglio, filed joint petitions for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy protection in October of
1999 and January of 2000, respectively.
During each of these bankruptcy proceedings, the IRS filed proofs of claims
for unpaid employment taxes assessed against the partnership. The general partners
objected to these claims, arguing that although the tax liability had been properly
assessed against the partnership within the three-year statute of limitations, the
resulting ten-year extension of liability only applied to the partnership. Basically, the
partners asserted that since the tax assessment had not been applied to them
individually, the statute of limitations had run and they were no longer liable for the
partnership’s tax debt. The partners claimed that since they were ultimately
responsible for the partnership’s debt, they were the relevant taxpayers and should
have been assessed individually. Furthermore, the partners asserted that since they
were jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debt under California law, they
were primarily responsible for the debt and thus the relevant taxpayers. The trial and
appellate courts agreed with the partners.
Internal Revenue Code § 6501(a) provides that any tax liability imposed
under the Code must be assessed within three years of the filing of the tax return.
However, any liability that was properly assessed within that three-year limit expands
the statute of limitations for that liability to ten years.
Section 6303 of the IRC requires the Secretary of the Treasury to give notice
to each person liable for the unpaid tax within sixty days of the assessment, “stating
the amount and demanding payment thereof.” Since the partners were ultimately
liable for the partnership’s unpaid tax debt and they never received notice
individually, the partners argued that the statute of limitations had run.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and
held that the only relevant taxpayer was the partnership and the properly assessed tax
liability against the partnership was sufficient to extend the ten-year statute of
limitations for collecting tax liability to the general partners who were liable for the
partnership’s debt.
The Court ruled that the tax assessed was an employment tax and thus it was
specifically assessed against the employer. Although the individual partners may
have been liable for the partnership’s debts, they were not themselves the employer.
The Court analyzed the tax assessment function, pointing out that companies usually
assess their own tax liability and file returns with the government. In some cases
when such self-assessment is incorrect or fraudulent, the Secretary of the Treasury
can reject the incorrect assessment and record the correct tax liability in the books.
The IRS can then use various enforcement devices to collect the tax. The proper
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interpretation of the assessment function is that it is the amount of the tax that is
assessed, not the taxpayer.
Citing United States v. Updike, 281U.S. 489 (1930), the Court noted that the
ten-year extension of the statute of limitations applied to the debt as a whole, not the
individual taxpayer assessed. The IRS is not required to separately assess the same
tax against individuals who may be liable for the tax but are not the actual taxpayers.
The consequences of the tax assessment attach to the tax debt regardless of the
“special circumstances of the secondarily liable parties.”
As the Court declined to consider whether a tax assessment against a
partnership is sufficient for the IRS to enforce collection through a lien or levy
against an individual partner’s property, this ruling appears to be extremely narrow.
In fact, the ruling addresses only the liability that attaches to employment tax in a
judicial proceeding such as bankruptcy. The Court did not address other liabilities
general partners may incur because of a partnership’s default.
As the Galletti case illustrates, individuals or entities that are secondarily liable
for the debts of another entity are not themselves employers and are neither required
nor entitled to individual assessment for the employment tax liability assessed against
the entity. However, these parties remain liable for the tax debt assessed against the
entity. In smaller, closely held entities such as general partnerships, the secondarily
liable parties should have little trouble determining the extent of their liability
resulting from a default by the larger entity. To avoid unpleasant surprises, partners
and others secondarily liable for debt in general—and employment tax debt
specifically—should stay abreast of any outstanding debt the larger entity incurs.
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